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Nationalistic Massacre Victims Triumph over CCP 
“I hated the Japanese. I hated them to the gut… for destroying our country,” one survivor 
of the Nanjing Massacre stated bluntly. 1Another survivor asserted, “Americans were really nice 
to us… Had it not been for their help, how could we be alive?”2 A third survivor argued, “In the 
past, Chairman Mao talked about world revolution. But my idea is that revolution in a country 
should be led only by their people.”3 These accounts all shared a common thread: each, for their 
own reasons, conflicted with the Communist Party narrative propagated throughout China 
following World War II. Although the CCP was determined to suppress Nanjing Massacre 
victim accounts and push a class-based, revolutionary doctrine upon the Chinese people, a 
nationalistic paradigm prevailed, and victim testimonies arose to public consciousness which 
challenged and invalidated CCP ideology.  Ultimately, fueled by a fiercely violent event, a 
nationalistic culture powerfully expressed itself even in such a top-down controlled society as 
that of Communist China. 
Thus, the Nanjing Massacre, one of the seminal events of Chinese—and world-history, 
had major consequences. Among survivors, it not only seared an enduring impact, it affected 
their views of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its role on the world stage. Furthermore, 
Chinese nationalism endured despite CCP efforts to replace it with a class-based political 
narrative during the mid to late twentieth century. This paper argues that Chinese Massacre 
victims contributed to this growth in the nationalistic perspective through their experiences and 
 
1Yi Cuilan, segment 20, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
2 Chen Wenying, segments 9-10 and 20, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
3 Zhou Webin, segment 26-28, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
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memories, and they came to view the CCP as a force for national security and not world 
liberation for the working class, due to their desire for peace and security. 
 This research contributes new primary source analysis to the Nanjing Massacre 
historiography, and places new emphasis upon how CCP ideology affected the nationalistic 
views of Nanjing’s survivors . More broadly speaking, the Nanjing Massacre has been and 
continues to be a subject of historical study which carries very real and serious repercussions into 
our present day. Some Massacre victims remain alive today, making the Massacre’s past a living 
history. In this manner, this paper seeks to answer the call invoked by the scholar Mark Eykholt, 
who implores future students of the Nanjing Massacre to “venture beyond description of the 
horrors and toward a direct effort to understand the meaning and implications of the Massacre.”4 
Indeed, this paper makes this effort by analyzing the political implications embedded in victim 
accounts and CCP motivations. 
 Iris Chang’s 1997 book The Rape of Nanking remains a controversial study of the 
Massacre, largely because its author was neither credentialed nor was the book academically 
sound. Yet the mass appeal of Chang’s book cannot be discounted. Chang’s work marked a 
crucial stage in the development of Nanjing Massacre historiography. As Erik Ropers explains,  
The Rape of Nanking sparked “vociferous and inflammatory debates,” among scholars.5 These 
debates drove new academic and public attention on the Nanjing Massacre, and a steady flow of 
scholarly analysis regarding the Massacre has followed ever since. 
 
4 Mark Eykholt, “Chinese Historiography of the Massacre,” in The Nanjing Massacre: History and Historiography, 
ed Joshua Fogel (London: University of California Press, 2000) 59. 
5 Erik Ropers, “Debating History and Memory: Examining the Controversy Surrounding Iris Chang’s The Rape of 
Nanking,” in Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights Humanitarianism, and Development, vol 8, no 
1, (Spring 2017), 77. 
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 Two foundational books in Nanjing Massacre historiography are The Nanjing Massacre: 
in History and Historiography, published in 2001, and The Making of the “Rape of Nanking”: 
History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States, published in 2006. The former is 
edited by Scholar Joshua Fogel, with Mark Eykholt contributing the chapter “Aggression, 
Victimization, and Chinese Historiography of the Nanjing Massacre”; the latter is written by 
historian Takashi Yoshida. 
 Fogel’s work as a whole clarifies the “interest groups, ideological points of view, schools 
of thought, scholarly rifts, personal antagonisms, and political intrusions into scholarship…” 
which surround the documentation and memorialization of the Nanjing Massacre, often 
manipulating the historical reality of what occurred. Eykholt’s analysis of Chinese responses to 
the Nanjing Massacre lays out the various ways the Chinese Communists utilized the Massacre’s 
record for their own political ends, and how this historical manipulation ultimately became 
untenable. This paper’s research is concerned primarily with the “inter-Chinese struggles,” 
which resulted from the Chinese government’s choice to use the Massacre as a “tool for political 
struggle,” and the popular response.6 
 Yoshida studies the political misappropriation of the Nanjing Massacre from the 
perspectives of the Japanese, Americans, and Chinese. Among other things, he concludes that 
both the Nationalist party and the Communist party “similarly” manipulated the Massacre’s 
memorialization for their political ends. While these similarities are not denied by this paper, 
more recent research has revealed an alternative narrative. It appears that the treatment of the 
Nanjing Massacre by the Nationalists and then the Communists held more striking differences 
 
6 Mark Eykholt, 57. 
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than made apparent by Yoshida. Scholar Wang Xiaokui’s 2017 findings display a Nationalist 
party of China which “conducted preliminary investigations and organized memorial services” 
between 1945 and 1947.7 On the other hand, Communist China suppressed memorialization of 
the Nanjing Massacre due to an ideology of class-warfare following 1949.8 The conclusions 
made by this paper are in line with the findings of Xiaokui, which emphasize the unique 
ideological motivation of the Chinese Communists in suppressing the Nanjing Massacre’s 
history. 
 Throughout all Nanjing Massacre historiography there exists a wide range of primary 
source materials. These materials include government documents from America, Japan, and 
China. Court documents from the Tokyo Trials and the military tribunals conducted under 
Nationalist China are also analyzed. Scholars look at letters and diaries of Western missionaries 
like Minnie Vautrin, firsthand accounts from John Rabe, the German businessman who 
organized a safety zone for Chinese during the Massacre, as well as the accounts of World War 
II fighter pilot John Magee Jr. Lastly, both American and international news sources are given 
careful attention. This research contributes new primary source analysis by considering oral 
testimonies provided by the USC Shoah Foundation video archive. The oral testimonies are not 
relied upon for ascertaining death counts, or dates of events, but are exclusively analyzed for 
what they reveal about the Massacre victims themselves. 
A Note on Terminology 
 
7 Wang Xiaokui, “Historical shifts in remembering China’s ‘Nanjing Massacre’,” in Chinese Studies in History, vol 
50, no 4 (Routledge, 2017), abstract. 
8 Wang Xiaokui, 328. 
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 The terms Nationalistic, Nationalism, and National Loyalty are utilized in this paper to 
capture and clarify the conflict of views between the Chinese Communist Party and the Massacre 
victims. The term Nationalistic describes a view which holds the implicit assumption that people 
are identified or categorized by a nation. For example, when one refers to the Japanese, one 
assumes the existence of a particular group of people which can be bounded and separated from 
others via their national background. In short, nationalistic is an adjective describing an 
identification of some people against others. Furthermore, for a view to be nationalistic does not 
imply any larger claims about the world – such as the claim that one national group should rule 
over another. 
 Nationalism, however, does make larger claims about the world. For Nationalism, as used 
in this paper, makes universal claims of superiority and inferiority between national groups. 
Nationalism is a step beyond a nationalistic tendency, as it compares the value of different 
national groups and their varying customs, habits, and traditions. In this manner, it is easy to 
conceive of nationalism becoming aggressive and violent. 
 Lastly, national loyalty is also a step beyond a nationalistic view because it assumes that 
a nation’s particular way of life is worth preserving and protecting. National loyalty does not 
make claims of superiority and inferiority between national groups, and therefore does not seek 
to impose one nation’s customs, habits, and traditions upon an outside group of people. National 
loyalty only becomes violent in cases of self-defense. Its claims are merely defensive by nature. 
These terms nationalism and national loyalty and their consequent distinctions are derived from 
5
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Roger Scruton’s A Political Philosophy.9 They were chosen for this paper because they provide 
clarifying power in the primary source analysis conducted. 
Summation of Nanjing Massacre Victims’ Perspective 
 Before a deeper investigation into the nationalistic beliefs espoused by Massacre victims 
is conducted, let a summation of their general views suffice. As the Massacre victims’ words 
previously introduced show, there was general agreement that the Japanese held culpability for 
the Massacre, as Yi Cuilan clearly demonstrated when she said, “I hated the Japanese.”10 The 
other victims reflected similar sentiments, and even those who forgave the Japanese still agreed 
that it was the national group of the Japanese who held responsibility for the Massacre. Among 
these victims, one also sees a general appreciation for and benevolence towards America, as 
Chen Wenying so well illuminated with the question, “Had it not been for their [America’s] help, 
how could we be alive?”11 Lastly, Massacre victims viewed the CCP as a national security force. 
The most explicit evidence of this lies in Zhou Webin’s testimony, when he openly disagreed 
with Mao’s views of world revolution and class-based warfare.12 These three central conceptions 
of Massacre victims’ political perspective, regarding Japan, America, and the role of the CCP, 
were subjected to dramatic shifts in public acceptance and suppression following World War II, 
with the continuously volatile political scene in China and the world. 
Massacre Victims’ Initial Treatment by KMT 
 
9 See Sir Roger Scruton’s “Conserving Nations” chapter in A Political Philosophy: Arguments for Conservatism, 
Continuum, 2006. 
10 Yi Cuilan, segment 20, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
11 Chen Wenying, segments 9-10 and 20, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
12 Zhou Webin, segment 26-28, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
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 Before the Communists controlled China and suppressed Nanjing Massacre victim 
accounts, China was run by the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT). Under KMT 
control of China, Nanjing Massacre victims evoked early signs of a nationalistic perspective by 
blaming the Japanese for perpetrating the Massacre. Furthermore, with a Chinese government 
and public sphere which accepted Massacre victim accounts, victims had ample opportunity to 
have their voices heard, and indeed they did actively work to inform the government and the 
public of their experiences. This treatment of Massacre victims would change dramatically 
however with the Communist takeover of China, and the nationalistic perspective of Massacre 
survivors would come in direct conflict with Communist doctrine. 
Between 1945 and 1947, Chinese Nationalist forces worked to preserve and publicize 
Japanese war atrocities under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek. This preservation and 
publicization allowed Massacre victims to share the stories of their tragic experiences. The 
Japanese atrocities were spread and legitimized by a variety of means, including news reports, 
investigative inquiries, and ceremonial remembrance of the Massacre. 
The Media and Massacre Victims 
News report headlines were not censored for their gruesomeness or antagonistic nature, 
allowing Massacre victims to achieve a level of honesty in their accounts not to be seen under 
the CCP. Headlines included phrasing such as “City of Nanjing Becomes a Sea of Blood,” and 
“Brutal Acts of a Brutal Army.”13 The former headline used grisly figurative language by 
describing a sea of blood, while the latter leveled an antagonistic accusation of brutality against 
the Japanese army. Furthermore, the media published stories of rapes and violent murders from 
 
13 Wang Xiaokui, 325. 
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the Nanjing Massacre, attesting to their uncensored approach to reporting and displaying 
Massacre victims’ willingness to provide intimate witness testimony14 Reports doubly 
participated in the honoring of Massacre victims, with headlines such as “Massacre of Heroes,” 
referring to the Nanjing Massacre victims in a way which raised their social status in the public 
eye. 
Legal Probes and Massacre Victims 
Further inquiries legitimized Massacre survivor experiences, and further displayed 
Massacre victims’ willingness to share their stories. In the years following the Massacre, the 
KMT government asked victims to bring forward legal charges against the Japanese, and 
received 1,036 accusations of such war crimes.15 As such, the KMT initiated three different 
commissions to examine Nanjing Massacre war crimes.16 To follow this up, in April of 1946 the 
KMT organized a military tribunal to try and execute Japanese officials for war crimes 
committed in Nanjing.17 These government actions enhanced public knowledge of the Nanjing 
Massacre. As a result, survivors were encouraged to come forward and share their accounts 
within the scope of these investigations. 
Ceremonies, Memorials and Massacre Victims 
Acceptance and publicization of Nanjing Massacre survivor accounts went beyond 
number gathering and news reports. The KMT went as far as making calls for commemoration 
and memorialization. The party-controlled paper mourned the loss of Chinese citizens to the 
 
14 Wang Xiaokui, 326. 
15 Wang Xiaokui, 326. 
16 Wang Xiaokui, 326. 
17 Takashi Yoshida, “China: Nationalizing Memory of the Nanjing Massacre,” in The Making of the ‘Rape of 
Nanking: History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 64. 
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Nanjing Massacre and demanded that this tragic event never be forgotten. Indeed, state efforts 
towards “ceremonies and funeral observances… and the construction of memorials” were 
prioritized by the Nationalist government.18 By memorializing this event, the KMT further 
established its historical legitimacy and honored those who experienced the Massacre’s tragic 
realities. 
Nationalistic Perspective 
The fundamental premise of survivor testimony and public memorialization was that the 
Japanese were the perpetrators of the massacre. From news reports which referred to a “brutal 
army” to government trials which accused Japanese officials of war crimes, the political 
narrative throughout these developments turned the blame upon the national group of Japan. 
With the commemoration of Massacre victims additionally came the acknowledgement of the 
Japanese perpetrators. 
Together, these news reports, legal probes, and memorials worked with Nanjing 
Massacre victim accounts to legitimize and publicize the Massacre and its perpetrators. In this 
environment, Massacre victims displayed a readiness to share their accounts. Ultimately, 
however, these initiatives were halted by Chinese Communist forces, setting the stage for 
conflict between Nanjing Massacre victims and the CCP. 
Massacre Victims’ Voices Censored by CCP 
Things drastically changed for Nanjing Massacre victims when the Communists wrested 
control from the Nationalists in 1949. The victims held a nationalistic view of the world as a 
result of their desire for peace and security, which stemmed from their lived experiences of the 
 
18 Wang Xiaokui, 326. 
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Massacre. Ultimately, this nationalistic perspective conflicted with Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) doctrine, which held class-based views that sought world revolution and not immediate 
peace. The nationalistic paradigm was partly responsible for the shift in CCP doctrine following 
the 1980s. Before CCP doctrine experienced this shift however, Chinese Communists pushed a 
class-warfare narrative upon the public and suppressed Massacre victim accounts. 
 Following the end of World War II and the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, 
the CCP took control of mainland China. Once in power, the Communists focused on solidifying 
their rule. To centralize power, the CCP demonized the Americans and Chinese Nationalists 
along with the Japanese. This demonization was implemented by conflating these three different 
political groups into one enemy team, seeking the destruction of Communist China. Together, 
America, the Kuomintang, and Japan, were part of an international capitalist conspiracy which 
aimed to imperialize China. 
Propagandizing Memorials, Media, and Academia 
One of the CCP’s efforts to control the Nanjing narrative was to alter commemorative 
monuments to fit the Party’s stance. In one inscription, recorded before and after the Communist 
takeover of China, the alterations clearly shifted memory of a Japanese atrocity committed 
against Chinese civilians to a crime committed by the capitalist cabal, of Japan, America, and the 
KMT, against the working class. Originally erected by the Nationalists in 1947, the monument’s 
inscription included acknowledgement of “the Japanese army” and its responsibility for the death 
of a group of electrical company workers who bravely continued to provide power to the Chinese 
during the war.19  
 
19 Wang Xiaokui, 327. 
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Rebuilt by the Communists in 1951, the monument’s new inscription formed a 
dichotomy between “we of the working class” and “the rich and powerful.” The inscription went 
on to claim that the enemy wanted to stifle the “workers’ spirit of class enmity.” It also assured 
readers that “the level of class consciousness has universally been raised.” Additionally, it 
fabricated an enemy larger than merely the Japanese by writing, “Chiang’s bandit gang and the 
Japanese invaders,” and “airplanes of Chiang and the Americans bombed our station”.20 All 
these lines displayed the ideological class fervor propagated by the CCP, and the manipulation of 
the enemy into a group beyond the Japanese, to include the Americans and the Nationalist Party. 
Beyond changing memorials, the CCP also inculcated a class-warfare mentality in the 
public through the media and academia. News reports and scholarly studies avoided 
consideration of the Nanjing Massacre victims and fabricated war crimes against the Americans. 
A media report blamed American missionaries for involving themselves in the war to protect 
American property instead of assisting the Chinese.21 Research completed at Nanjing University 
claimed that leaders of the Nanjing Safety Zone tolerated Japanese atrocities.22 Americans were 
referred to in the news as the “devil” and “evil.”23 Guo Moruo, a well-known scholar of Chinese 
history, discounted American deaths from Japanese attacks in his research. Additionally, school 
textbooks were rewritten to educate Chinese on the dangerous capitalist forces abroad.24 
Together these instances displayed the great effort in media and academia to push the Chinese 
Communist narrative. 
 
20 Wang Xiaokui, 328-29. 
21 Takashi Yoshida, 68. 
22 Mark Eykholt, 25. 
23 Takashi Yoshida, 68-69. 
24 Wang Xiaokui, 329. 
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Even when tensions between China and Japan began to be mended, and relations were 
normalized between the states in 1972, China’s “state-owned media made almost no references 
to the Nanjing Massacre.”25 Yet ultimately, the CCP’s effort to fabricate an international 
capitalist conspiracy- as seen in the alteration of monuments and suppression of Nanjing 
Massacre victim accounts- amounted to an unsuccessful campaign. Eventually, external and 
internal pressures pushed the CCP to change its ways. The major difficulty which the CCP faced 
during this time was how to counterbalance the nationalism of Nanjing’s survivors with the 
Party’s emphasis on class struggle in explaining the Massacre. 
CCP Motivations of Power and Ideology 
Summarily, the CCP and Nanjing survivors set the stage for open struggle over the 
memory of the Massacre. Let us next consider the driving forces behind these actions by the 
CCP. These various efforts at censorship and the push for a class-warfare narrative were driven 
by two central factors: Chinese Communist ideology and the Party’s hunger for power. 
Firstly, understanding Communisty ideology helps to reveal how the CCP became 
motivated to demonize America, and expound the existence of an international capitalist cabal. 
Firstly, Chinese Communist ideology motivated the demonization of America and the Chinese 
Nationalists as part of an international capitalistic cabal. The ideology of the Chinese 
Communists was a doctrine inherited from the Communist thinkers and political leaders of 
Europe. It was Mao Zedong who himself transformed the European doctrine into one 
comprehensible to the Chinese people. Until Communism spread across China, Chinese society 
was largely Confucian in its outlook. The USSR was the chief supplier of Communist 
 
25 Wang Xiaokui, 330. 
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philosophy for Mao, who then brought it to the rest of China.26 Indeed, Mao stated in his 
writings, “the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin can be applied to the whole 
universe.”27 Mao was insistent that to be a successful CCP member, one “must study 
Marxism.”28 Furthermore, Mao believed that there was a pattern to progress which he described 
as a development from “a low stage to a high stage.”29 In this manner, the current state of 
Chinese society was low and needed to be brought high by the guidance of the CCP. 
Because “Chinese radicals held imperialism responsible” for the social and political ills 
of China, and “Marxism promised, through class struggle against oppressors, an end to the 
disintegration of the country,” Mao and the CCP had great motivation to demonize Americans 
and Chinese Nationalists along with the Japanese.30 Furthermore, while the CCP was willing to 
acquire power by various means, “class struggle” amounted to the “essence of the Chinese 
Communist world outlook”31 In this way, Communist ideology motivated propaganda of a world 
capitalist cabal. Indeed, feeding into this propaganda was the undeniable fact of the United 
States’ global economic hegemony coming out of World War II. In this manner, Chinese 
Communism adopted a global environment with an extensive history of industrialization and 
economic strife. 
When looking at the suppression of Nanjing Massacre victim accounts, one sees the 
CCP’s general disregard for truth. The truth of the victims’ tragic experiences and resulting 
 
26 Xing Lu, The Rhetoric of Mao Zedong: Transforming China and its People (SC: University of South Carolina 
Press, 2017), 40, 95. 
27 Stuart R. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Zedong (New York: Praeger, 1969), 171. 
28 Stuart Schram, 172. 
29 Stuart Schram, 190. 
30 Arif Dirlik, Marxism in the Chinese Revolution (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
2005), 61-62. 
31 Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1966), 27. 
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memories was subjugated to the ideological fervor of the Chinese Communists. As will be later 
demonstrated, Chinese survivors from the Nanjing Massacre held perceptions which conflicted 
with the CCP political narrative, yet for the CCP this indicated no need for compromise. The 
victims were considered a part of the “low stage” to be brought to a “high stage,” which would 
imply forgetting their lived experiences when under attack from the Japanese. 
Secondly, hunger for power drove the Chinese Communists to suppress Massacre 
victims’ testimonies. Mao Zedong had a clear vision for establishing control over China, which  
included a political attitude comprised of a sense of aggression and victoriousness.32 To 
broadcast Massacre victim accounts and spread knowledge regarding Japanese atrocities against 
the Chinese would expose China to an image of weakness and victimization. Simply stated, this 
image of weakness could not be risked, so the CCP censored Massacre victim stories. As the 
scholar Peter Gries explains, the “Communist storyline was simple: without the Party-led defeat 
of the Japanese, there would be no New China.”33 Mao and the CCP preferred to portray an 
image of heroism and the realities of the Nanjing Massacre would only hinder this image. 
If ever the Japanese atrocities were mentioned it was strictly to serve as a mere “political 
tool” in the eyes of the CCP to be utilized in the effort towards total control.34 To publish 
anything involving Nanjing Massacre survivors and their experiences of Japanese atrocities was 
censured by the CCP. The Communists suppressed victim testimonies because they would 
 
32 Peter Hays Gries, “Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy,” in China’s New Nationalism (University of California Press, 
2004), 69-70. 
33 Peter Gries, 73. 
34 Mark Eykholt, 24. 
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remind citizens of “a time of weakness and invasion,” which undermined the goal of projecting 
resolution and success.35 
For these reasons, the CCP sought to suppress Nanjing Massacre victim testimonies in 
their greater project of extending political control over China. With the CCP’s ideological 
framework established, an examination of the CCP-Nanjing survivor conflict can be more 
thoroughly conducted.  
The Opposing Nationalistic Paradigm of Massacre Survivors 
Nanjing Massacre survivors held nationalistic views as a result of their desire for peace 
and security, which sharply contrasted with CCP doctrine. The nationalistic paradigm of 
Massacre survivors fundamentally conflicted with the Communist Party line in its conception of 
enemies and friends on the world stage, as well as in its conception of the CCP’s national role. 
While the CCP attempted to demonize the Japanese and the Americans by grouping them 
together in a capitalistic, imperialistic cabal, Massacre victims saw the Japanese and Americans 
as two distinct national groups. Despite Communist Party efforts to rally the Chinese behind a 
world revolution for the working class, survivors saw the CCP as strictly a national security force 
and called for world peace as opposed to world revolution. 
Japan: A Sole National Enemy 
Firstly, Nanjing Massacre victims differed with CCP doctrine by holding the Japanese 
exclusively responsible for war atrocities, as opposed to viewing the enemy in a global, 
bourgeois form. When asked to relate his struggles during the Massacre, Zhou Webin was 
explicit in his anger towards the Japanese as he asserts that he and his family “have a low 
 
35 Mark Eykholt, 25-26. 
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opinion of the Japanese.”36 Another victim, named Jin Maozhi, related the painful story of seeing 
his father die at the hands of Japanese soldiers. Maozhi stated, “I watched my father die and I 
dare not move.” Throughout his testimony, Maozhi continuously referred to the perpetrators by 
their home nation, Japan. Whether it be the “Japanese army,” the “Japanese [who] wielded his 
bayonet,” or the “Japanese soldiers,” Maozhi’s speech was suffused with a nationalistic division 
between victims and perpetrators, and the perpetrators exclusively stemmed from the nation of 
Japan.37 
Like Maozhi, Liu Guixiang also saw his dad killed at the hands of the Japanese. 
Additionally, he asserted that seeing his “house burned” and his “brother… thrown into the 
water” were “very hard to forget.” Because of this, Guixiang said, “I dislike the Japanese very 
much.”38 He took these thoughts further when he stated, “I feel it [Japan] is a rogue state. It 
doesn’t admit to its crimes… how do we expect the deniers to compensate?”39 From this another 
layer of the view of the enemy was revealed. The Massacre victims continued to suffer into the 
present from the repercussions of this traumatic event, and victims such as Guixiang believed 
that compensation from the Japanese was in accord. In this manner, the national group of Japan 
was expected to provide reparations. 
Regardless of the unique circumstances for each victim, the exclusive view of the 
Japanese nation as an enemy continued to find expression. Yi Cuilan explained, “Japanese 
soldiers attempted to take my sister-in-law.”40 Al Yiying stated, “I will remember the evil deeds 
 
36 Jin Maozhi, segment 23, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
37 Jin Maozhi, segment 15-22, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
38 Liu Guixiang, segments 25-32, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
39 Liu Guixiang, segment 94, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
40 Yi Cuilan, segments 10-12, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
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of the Japanese in China as long as I live.”41 Ruan Dingdong admitted that ever since the 
Massacre, “I hated the Japanese. I hated them to the gut… for destroying our country.”42 Cheng 
Fubao said, “I accuse Japanese fascists [for] what they’ve done in China.”43 The perpetrators 
were not merely individuals in these testimonies. Instead, they embodied the nation of Japan. 
Moreover, this national identification became deeply entwined with victims’ firsthand suffering 
and subsequent anger. 
Not all analyzed testimonies revealed vitriolic attitudes towards the Japanese, yet even 
those who were more forgiving considered themselves to be forgiving towards the nation of 
Japan. Cen Honggui asserted that the “Japanese people are kind”44 and “the Japanese are the 
same as you and me.”45 He acknowledged that the Japanese “slaughtered so many Chinese 
people,”46 but that the Japanese youth do not think like their elders did.47 The dividing of 
Chinese and Japanese people, as victim and perpetrator, permeated Honngui’s memories of the 
Massacre. Another interviewee, Chen Wenying, even went to work as a babysitter for a Japanese 
family following Japan’s surrender after World War II, saying, “Honestly, [the] Japanese were 
really friendly.”48 Yang Cuiying recounted her impression of a Japanese audience, who post-
Massacre were listening to her oral history, as she explained, “I hate the Japanese who killed my 
four family members, but now I do not hate these Japanese.”49 Even when hatred left the minds 
of the more magnanimous victims, they acknowledged that the perpetrators were Japanese. In 
 
41 Al Yiying, segment 55, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
42 Ruan Dingdong, segment 20, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
43 Cheng Fubao, segments 1-2, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
44 Cen Honggui, segments 46-47, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
45 Cen Honggui, segments 49-50, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
46 Cen Honggui, segments 45, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
47 Cen Honggui, segments 46-47, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
48 Chen Wenying, segments 28-30, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
49 Yang Cuiying, segment 44, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
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this manner, a nationalistic political perspective provided a basic unit for understanding the 
perpetrators. All the while, class was not mentioned by any of the victims, as none thought they 
were threatened or harmed for being members of a proletariat class. This was in direct contrast to 
the Communist Party line which argued for proletariat victimization during the war. 
America: A Benevolent Nation 
 Another point at which the CCP narrative diverges from survivor testimony pertains to 
the latter’s perspective on the United States in World War II. While not all victims mentioned 
America, and others gave passing mention to it, those who took the time to share their feelings 
towards America were incredibly positive. In this way, Nanjing Massacre victims disagreed with 
the CCP narrative of demonizing America and defining it not as a nation but part of a global 
capitalist conspiracy. 
 Massacre victims came to see America as a hero in its various forms of humanitarian 
outreach during the Japanese invasion of China. In Chen Wenying’s testimony, an individual 
named “Miss Hua” came to represent the benevolent force of America. Miss Hua was the 
Chinese name given to the American Christian missionary Minnie Vautrin. Vautrin erected a 
safety zone for Nanjing Massacre victims, and in doing so she consistently put her life at great 
risk. Wenying related seeing that the “Japanese slapped Miss Hua’s face…” and that “there was 
nothing Miss Hua could do.”50 She then asserted that “had it not been [for] Miss Hua’s help, we 
Chinese would have died out.”51 In this way, Vautrin became a symbol of American goodwill 
towards the Chinese. For Wenying, the reality of America as a benevolent nation was clear. 
 
50 Chen Wenying, segments 9-10, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
51 Chen Wenying, segments 9-10, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
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 Other victims concurred with Wenyings account and disagreed with the CCP 
demonization of America. Yi Cuilan argued that “we would’ve been long dead if she [Miss Hua] 
hadn’t been there.”52 Cuilan also witnessed Vautrin raising flags to establish the safety zone and 
she believed this effort was integral to saving lives. Yang Cuiying told of her mother being 
blinded in the Massacre, and that “fortunately a Miss Hua from America gave out porridge for a 
month.”53 Another victim, Cai Lihua, said, “She [Miss Hua] saved numerous refugees’ lives by 
offering us porridge twice a day.”54 Lihua was another witness of Vautrin being slapped in the 
face by Japanese soldiers as well. She explained that the slap was instigated when Vautrin 
refused to hand over young Chinese girls to the soldiers.55 Lihua also noted that the Red Cross 
was symbolic of American concern for Nanjing’s suffering.56 
 The congenial impressions of America in victim testimonies continued in other forms. 
When Chang Zhiqiang was asked of his impression of America, he mentioned the establishment 
of refugee camps and how “only in the refugee camp the Japanese dared not slaughter or set 
fire.”57 Moreover, Chen Fenying explained how “many women stayed in the refugee zone. They 
were protected.”58 Whether it be Minnie Vautrin, the American Red Cross, or the United States 
at large, victims who spoke of America depicted it in a positive light. These views were a crucial 
and conflicting factor between the victim’s firsthand experiences, and the narrative pushed by the 
Chinese Communists. Instead of a nefarious world entity, America was seen as a benevolent 
national force. 
 
52 Yi Cuilan, segments 15-16, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
53 Yang Cuiying, segment 38, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
54 Cai Lihua, segments 17-18, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
55 Cai Lihua, segments 17-18, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
56 Cai Lihua, segments 17-18, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
57 Chang Zhiqiang, segment 11, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
58 Chen Fenying, segment 25, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
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The Communist Party: A National Security Force 
 Beside the disagreement regarding the Japanese and Americans, Massacre survivors also 
conflicted in their views of the CCP regarding the purpose of the Communist Party itself. 
Because the CCP’s reign continues into the present day, it is difficult to tell how earnest victims 
can be in their criticisms. Talk of national security was prevalent all the same, and a general 
distaste for violence left victims apathetic towards world revolution. In tandem, these realities 
presented a stark contrast to the Chinese Communist push for global revolution against the 
imperialist, capitalist class. 
 For one particular victim, the CCP was better advised to remain within its national 
borders than to instill revolution throughout the world. Zhou Webin stated, “I hope they [the 
CCP] can work hard to build a strong nation.” In the same breath, he explicitly disagreed with 
Mao when he asserted, “Chairman Mao talked about world revolution. But my idea is that 
revolution in a country should be led by their people.”59 Webin emphasized the nation as a basic 
unit of defense. Moreover, he disagreed with Mao’s political doctrine by connecting people to 
their national origin and not the class they may belong to. In this testimony, the nationalistic 
perspective and its conflict with the class-based communist view was most visible. 
Even when more sympathetic towards the CCP, Massacre victims failed to explicitly 
support any global Communist effort. For instance, Jin Maozhi stated, “Chairman Mao liberated 
China.”60 He did not say Mao freed the working class, and he did not mention any world 
capitalist enemy. Liu Guixiang argued that “if it were not [for] the Communist Party of China, 
 
59 Zhou Webin, segments 26-28, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
60 Jin Maozhi, segments 53-55, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
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we wouldn’t have risen to our feet… In those years, we were always bullied by foreigners.”61 
Guixiang commended the CCP’s ability to keep his land safe from “foreigners,” as in people 
from other nations, but not people of any particular economic class. Another interviewee, Yang 
Cuiying, said, “I want our comrades to work hard, defend our country, defend world peace, and 
defend the peace of our country.”62 Both Guixiang and Cuiying saw the CCP as a national force, 
and from this national force, peace stemmed. The connection between nation building and peace 
was clear here. 
Another victim of note displays disagreement with the CCP in what she did not say. Chen 
Wenying did not mention Mao at all when asked of her impression of the CCP during and after 
the Massacre. This was unique in that all the other analyzed victims mentioned Mao in some 
capacity. Instead of talking about Mao, Wenying spoke of how hard she worked under the 
CCP.63 This could be taken as a hidden criticism, yet she did concede that the CCP was fair and 
kind. Beyond speculation, however, is the fact that Mao’s doctrine went unmentioned, and class 
liberation did not appear embraced by the victim in any explicit respect. 
In summation, the victims’ testimonies as a whole presented an opposing nationalistic 
paradigm to the CCP’s preferred class paradigm. Through the variation of experience lay a 
nation-based comprehension of friends and foes in the Nanjing Massacre. Moreover, victims 
identified the Japanese exclusively as the perpetrators of the Massacre while they imparted 
thanks upon the Americans’ compassionate efforts during the war. Lastly, while the CCP sought 
 
61 Liu Guixiang, segments 25-32, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
62 Yang Cuiying, segments 20-21, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
63 Chen Wenying, segments 38-39, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
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to instill a world revolutionary attitude upon the Chinese, Massacre survivors saw the CCP more 
as a national security force than global champion of the proletariat class. 
Pain and Anger Evolves into Desire for Peace and Security 
In holding a nationalistic paradigm which opposed the Communist Party line of a class-
based worldview, Massacre survivors were motivated by a desire for peace and security. 
Interestingly, very little of the victims’ animosity towards Japanese perpetrators led to any desire 
for renewed violence and aggression against Japan. While one victim said that she would like to 
see the Japanese forever hated for the Massacre, many others spoke strictly of desire for peace 
and security. This desire was revealed in the victims’ consistent emphasis of historical memory 
as a tool for avoiding war.  
Firstly, victims were insistent that the Nanjing Massacre never be forgotten. “China can’t 
forget the history. We can’t,” stated Liu Guixiang;64 “You can’t forget that history, can you?” 
argued Cen Honggui;65 “I will not forget,” Yang Cuiying assured listeners.66 However, survivors 
did not stop here, arguing further that Japan’s aggression required a diligent historical awareness, 
because through this awareness, security and peace might be maintained. Chen Fenying 
explained that the “Japanese bullied… the Chinese.”67 Guixiang echoed this sentiment saying, 
“in those years, we were always bullied by foreigners. It was rather painful.”68 The victims 
 
64 Liu Guixiang, segments 25-32, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
65 Cen Honggui, segments 25-31, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
66 Yang Cuiying, segments 69-70, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
67 Chen Fenying, segment 42, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
68 Liu Guixiang, segments 25-32, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
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emphasized this to make the point that “we should keep the family history firmly in mind and 
avoid war.”69  
While some victims harbored deep hatred, like Cai Lihua stating that she wanted to tell 
the youth of China “to never forget the hatred”70 towards the Japanese, the victims generally 
aimed to remember the Nanjing Massacre in order to forge a more peaceful future. Zhou Webin 
said that “my only hope is that [the Chinese youth] cherish peace… live in peace with each 
other.”71 Cheng Fubao pragmatically argued that “since Japan and China are neighbors in 
geography, we should get along well with each other.”72 Together these sentiments signified a 
desire for peace and security through memory of the Nanjing Massacre and the nationalistic 
paradigm which was embedded in its telling. 
This translation of a nationalistic perspective into peaceful efforts can be more clearly 
understood when the distinction between national loyalty and nationalism is applied. National 
loyalty is a disposition which expresses an appreciation for one’s own culture and customs, while 
nationalism takes this disposition a step further by seeking to impose one’s own national banner 
upon other states. Two factors contributed to the shift towards national loyalty and not a shift 
towards a more aggressive nationalism: firstly, the Japanese reversed their policy of denial 
following the 1980s textbook controversy, with some Japanese even inviting Massacre victims to 
speak in Japan; secondly, the victims themselves grew tired from the violence they were so long 
subjected to. 
 
69 Chen Guixiang, Seg 31-32, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
70 Chen Guixiang, segments 61-62, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
71 Cai Lihua, segments 26-28, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
72 Zhou Webin, segments 1-2, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
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Evidence points to the conclusion that Japanese efforts at reconciliation with Massacre 
victims cultivated more congenial relations between the victims and the Japanese. One victim, 
Cen Hongguim, proudly shared his experience with the Japanese. At a conference held in Japan, 
Cen stated “I was invited to attend a meeting and deliver a speech. Japanese people are kind… 
They are polite to Chinese people… very polite. They are very kind.”73 The contiguity of the 
statements that he delivered a speech and the Japanese people are kind is such that one appears 
to have caused the other. It was after giving his speech that Cen found the reception by the 
Japanese to be kind and polite.  Furthermore, by listening to the live testimony of a victim who 
embodied the crimes committed by Japanese soldiers, the Japanese audience participated in a 
clear act of reconciliation. 
Another victim, who was also invited to speak before a Japanese audience in Japan on her 
tragic memories, shared a similar experience. Following her speech, an audience member asked 
if she hated the Japanese as a result of her experiences. Her answer is commendable, as she 
stated, “the Japanese sitting here I do not hate, because we are friends.”74 Yang Cuiying 
distinguished between the Japanese perpetrators and those Japanese listening to her struggles. 
The outreach performed by Japan clearly cultivated a sense of congeniality between China and 
Japan and helped mitigate aggressive nationalist tendencies in Massacre victims. 
For some Massacre victims though, the Japanese made a negative and lasting impression. 
Cai Lihua, who never wanted the Chinese youth to lose hatred for the Japanese,75 was adamant 
about her experience with a Japanese reporter. She exclaimed, “how could the Japanese come to 
 
73 Cen Honggui, segments 46-47, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
74 Yang Cuiying, segment 43, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
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visit me?... I have communicated with a Japanese reporter… He had no response and just gave 
me his card. Yes, his card. Then he went away.”76 She felt dismissed by the fact that the reporter 
showed little care for her tragic experiences. This negative interaction further showed the power 
in personal relations between the Japanese and Chinese, attesting to the power of Japanese 
outreach with victims when it was successful, and what resulted when it was not successfully 
accomplished. 
In totality, the violence which Massacre survivors experienced in 1937 translated directly 
into their desires for peace in the modern age. Victims not only experienced the Nanjing 
Massacre itself, but also lived through World War II and the resumption of the Chinese Civil 
War. This historical reality, combined with later efforts at Japanese outreach to Massacre 
victims, led to a desire for peace and security in victims. Furthermore, victims’ nationalistic 
perspective evolved only into national loyalty and not the more aggressive disposition of 
nationalism.  
Massacre Victims’ Triumph Over CCP 
Due to their desire for peace and security, Massacre survivors held a nationalistic 
perspective which went against CCP doctrine. The nationalistic perspective eventually succeeded 
over the class-based revolutionary line of the CCP, in part because the stories of Nanjing 
Massacre victims gained public accessibility and authority following the 1980s. As the Massacre 
survivors gained public audiences and political legitimacy, their nationalistic perspectives posed 
a growing threat to the CCP. In this context, victim narratives achieved widespread acceptance 
by the public for both external and internal reasons.  
 
76 Cai Lihua, segments 54-56, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
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Externally, Japanese educational practices regarding the Nanjing Massacre and World 
War II in general provoked controversy in China. This uproar pushed various Chinese groups to 
respond to Japanese denials using victims' stories, and it motivated the victims themselves to 
share their painful memories. Internally, CCP concerns over maintaining power led the 
Communists to compromise their doctrine and relent to the victims’ narratives. Together, these 
factors bolstered a nationalistic perspective by legitimizing and publicizing Massacre victims’ 
perspectives.  
Ultimately, the persisting presence of the Nanjing Massacre on the public stage, and the 
enduring nationalistic views of Massacre victims despite CCP censorship and propaganda show 
the power in the Massacre as an event and its memory. While the CCP was able to maintain 
control of China, it was only able to do so after compromising with the nationalistic perspective 
espoused by Massacre victims. Furthermore, the Massacre victims did not take to the streets in 
protest, but simply gained publicity following the antagonistic current of world events. For it was 
Japanese denial of the Massacre and internal CCP weaknesses which created a vacuum in the 
political narrative for Massacre victims to fill. The fact that these victims were ready at this 
opportune moment attested to the depth of their remembered experiences and the nationalistic 
reflections they made resulting from these memories. 
External: Textbook Controversy Instigates Massacre Accounts 
External political developments provided Nanjing Massacre victims with a crisis which 
encouraged the sharing of their experiences on the international stage. When Massacre 
testimonies gained public access, they simultaneously gained political legitimacy and so posed a 
threat to CCP doctrine. In 1972, Japan and China forged a new amiable relationship. Japan 
acknowledged the CCP as the official governing body of China, and the Chinese responded with 
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efforts towards peace and reconciliation.77 Following this, in the 1980s, the Japanese Ministry of 
Education issued textbook emendations which stoked an angry response from the Chinese. The 
just prior neighborly effort to coexist only increased the pang of betrayal when the Chinese 
media reported on the “toning down [of] Japan’s war imperialism in public school textbooks.”78 
This betrayal and subsequent anger fueled the rise of Massacre victim narratives.  
The revisions included, among other things, redefining the predatory nature of Japan’s 
assault into more innocuous terms, and ascribing responsibility for acts of barbarity to the 
victims themselves.79 The Chinese were aggrieved at discovering this, and various groups in 
China felt obligated to respond to Japan’s portrayal (or lack thereof) of the Nanjing Massacre 
and the war which encompassed it. Chinese responses largely stemmed from the media, 
academics, and government officials, who all used Massacre victim narratives as evidence for 
combatting Japanese atrocity denials. 
The Media 
Media outlets contributed to the legitimization of Nanjing Massacre testimonies, which 
increased pressure against the CCP class-based doctrine. For their part, the Chinese media 
responded to Japan’s textbook revisions by providing daily coverage of educational 
developments in Japan, publishing articles on Chinese responses, and showcasing victim 
testimonies. The official newspaper of China Renmin Ribao, or “People’s Daily,” established 
day-to-day reporting of Japan’s educational decision-making. Furthermore, “testimonies of 
survivors” achieved national recognition “through newspapers and radio broadcasts.”80 By 
 
77 Takashi Yoshida, 102. 
78 Mark Eykholt, 28. 
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bringing the textbook controversy to the public eye and consistently reporting on the event’s 
developments and resulting reactions, the Chinese media provided legitimacy to the criticism of  
Japan’s curriculum regarding World War II. With the controversy’s newfound legitimacy, the 
stories of Nanjing Massacre victims also garnered permissibility and authority as an effective 
tool for combating Japanese denial. 
Academics and Government Officials 
Academics and government officials of China also contributed to the success of the 
nationalistic perspective. Academics funded studies on the Nanjing Massacre and officials 
established holidays of remembrance related to the Second Sino-Japanese War. The former 
relied upon victim experiences as research data, the latter honored victims’ suffering. To resist 
Japanese revisions, “Chinese scholars organized symposia and protested.”81 Moreover, this anger 
was shared by government officials who promoted new education surrounding the Second Sino-
Japanese War by approving annual days of commemoration and memorials of Japanese 
atrocities.82 In sum, these actions brought the Nanjing Massacre to a higher level of public 
consciousness, assisting in the dissemination of victims’ narratives, and by extension, their 
nationalistic perspective. 
The Survivors 
 Besides the newfound endeavors of the media, academics, and government officials to 
legitimize victims narratives, the survivors themselves acquired a willingness to share their 
experiences, as they felt an obligation to speak out against the denial of atrocities.83 Victim 
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participation in the public discourse continued from the 1980s into the present, and the oral 
testimonies analyzed reflected these sentiments for correcting the Japanese whitewashing of 
history. It was the survivor’s frustration which sparked their willingness to share their 
experiences with the media, even when sharing this was painful. One victim stated bluntly, “they 
[Japanese revisionists] are lying. Come to Nanjing, and I think there are still about 100 
survivors,”84 and another similarly said, “just come to China, come to Nanjing and see it [for] 
yourself in the Massacre Museum.”85 Both accounts referred to survivors and their museum as 
proof against the Japanese educational narrative, and they revealed the tension that incentivized 
memorializing this event.  
As Cen Honggui insisted in his testimony, “I saw it with my own eyes. I saw them 
shooting people.”86 His resolution that he perceived Japanese atrocities first-hand reflected his 
efforts to combat deniers of the Massacre’s realities. Additionally, Yang Cuiying, who visited 
Japan like several other survivors to share her experience, explained, “during the two weeks of 
our staying in Japan, I told them the story… and so I wept for two weeks.”87 The pain that 
Cuiying had to endure when sharing her story did not prevent her from doing so, displaying the 
motivation that Japanese revisionists sparked in Massacre victims. In this way, the tension 
originally sparked by changes made to Japanese textbooks galvanized victims to share their 
stories. By sharing their experiences, the victims’ nationalistic perspective gained new 
recognition in the public eye. 
Internal: CCP Surrenders to Nationalism to Maintain Power 
 
84 Zhou Webin, segments 26-28, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
85 Cen Honggui, segments 46-47, USC Shoah Foundation: Visual Online Archive. 
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Political developments in China also contributed to the success of the nationalistic 
paradigm held by Massacre survivors. With the death of Mao Zedong and the end of the Cultural 
Revolution, China found itself struggling in turmoil. Competition between political factions to 
take control forced the new leadership of the CCP to compromise Communist doctrine in favor 
of a nationalistic approach. Moreover, the previous suppression of victim narratives to project an 
image of international strength was replaced by a new appreciation for China’s national 
struggles. 
Mao’s Death 
Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, political groups competed for future control 
over China. Groups such as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) placed pressure on the CCP, as 
they sought to incorporate themselves into the CCP’s military ranks. For this reason, the CCP 
sought new ways of maintaining broad public appeal which were previously prevented by Mao. 
Among other things “the teaching of the war was linked with the political goal of promoting 
patriotism…”88 Patriotism provided an effective way of combating the popularity of the PLA. 
Later, the CCP took the use of nationalism a step further by including it in new educational 
initiatives, as evinced when the propaganda department and Research Office of the Secretariat 
“issued a joint statement calling for a strengthening of patriotic education.”89 
End of Cultural Revolution 
The Cultural Revolution, a ten-years-long government led effort to purify the social and 
political environment of China, also came to an end in 1976. This decade-long event caused 
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incredible hardship. With Mao’s efforts to accumulate personal power at the expense of  
‘revisionists’ in the Party, the CCP found themselves unpopular amongst the youth of China. 
Seeking to change their image in the eyes of these younger generations, the CCP again tapped 
into nationalistic propaganda.90 Nationalism offered a means to an improved image, because it 
“tended to be easily accepted… regardless of social status, occupation, ethnicity, age, culture, 
and ideology,” so it provided the ideal tool for fostering unity and political stability.91 In this 
manner, nationalism earned new favor in the CCP. With its acceptance came the legitimization 
of the nationalistic perspective in victim testimonies. 
Change in Nationalistic Tendencies of Later Generations 
New generations of Chinese youth have shown an increase in nationalistic tendencies 
compared to the views expressed previously by Nanjing Massacre victims. While Massacre 
victims sought to use the CCP as a force for national security, thus largely accepting the 
Communist government while dismissing its world-revolutionary ideology, new generations of 
youth have held more ambivalent views of the CCP.92 Nationalism coupled with “anxieties and 
uncertainties” have driven the youth of China to aggressively protest for more radical means of 
achieving national legitimacy.93 Overall, this displays CCP class-based ideology further waning 
among future Chinese citizens. It doubly shows the near impossible nature of successfully 
achieving ideological homogeneity by imposing, through a top-down approach, government 
propaganda and censorship. 
 
90 Takashi Yoshida, 105. 
91 Takashi Yoshida, 106. 
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Scholar Rou-Ian Chen argues that the end of the Cultural Revolution, the controversy 
over ownership of the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan, and the fall of the Soviet Union 
have all contributed to this rise in radical nationalism among the youth. With the end of the 
Cultural Revolution, Chinese youth returned home from rural parts of China. Previously 
occupied with their revolutionary efforts, the youth were then freed up in their time and energies 
to dedicate themselves to a new movement.94 Furthermore, tensions between Japan and China 
rose to new heights with the question of national sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. These 
islands contained oil, and more simply the dispute raised the stakes for each nation’s political 
legitimacy. The Chinese and Japanese refused to back down from their efforts at controlling the 
islands in order to display their national superiority.95 This controversy provided youth with an 
antagonistic force to rail against. Lastly, with the fall of the USSR, the CCP felt further obliged 
to rely upon nationalism to keep China unified and galvanized. So nationalistic propaganda rose 
to new levels.96 
Following these events, the 1990s saw the rise of a “popular nationalism,” which rivaled 
the past “pragmatic nationalism,” or patriotism, capitalized on by the CCP. Eventually, radical 
nationalism went beyond what the CCP had ever intended to impress upon its citizenry, but 
government efforts were unable to quell the radical nationalism. So, to save face, the CCP was 
“forced to plead with protestors.”97 In this manner, Chinese youth have overtime come to replace 
Massacre victims’ desire for peace and security with a more aggressive Chinese nationalism. 
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With this aggressive nationalism, Japanese war crimes became fodder for stoking hatred, no 
longer merely incentivizing self-defense and peace.  
Conclusion 
 This paper has investigated the deep conflicting political perspectives between views held 
by Nanjing Massacre victims and those views of Chinese Communist Party doctrine. 
Furthermore, it has proposed an explanation for both the translation of pain and anger held by 
Massacre victims towards the Japanese into a yearning for peace and security, as well as 
provided analysis of Massacre victims’ success over the suppression of the CCP. While the 
future of nationalistic tendencies and its more dangerous cousin nationalism remain uncertain in 
China, one thing appears evident. The voices of Nanjing Massacre victims have achieved 
unprecedented attention and legitimization not only in China but across the globe in the present 
time, and historical scholarship on the continued repercussions of the Nanjing Massacre and its 
consecutive political turmoil has still much to reveal. 
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